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PURCHASER LIABILITY FOR THE RESTORATION OF 
ILLEGALLY FILLED WETLANDS UNDER SECTION 
404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
John Webster Kilborn* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Wetlands were once perceived as ugly, evil places. Now, they are 
treasured as ecosystems that support a broad diversity of animal 
and plant life and provide many economic and ecological benefits. 1 
Wetlands, however, are disappearing at an alarming rate. 2 Federal 
law protects wetlands, and the government may force parties who 
fill wetlands illegally to restore them to their pre-filled condition.3 
Nevertheless, courts have not held subsequent purchasers of ille-
gally filled wetlands liable for the restoration of illegally filled wet-
lands. 4 To prevent wetlands losses, courts should hold purchasers 
liable for restoration . 
• Executive Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. The author thanks Brian Valiton, Ann Williams-Dawe, and Ken Morafffor their valuable 
assistance, and Lisa Riceman for her constant support. 
1 See 33 C.F.R. 320.4(b)(2) (1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 271(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
86-87, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1190-9l. 
2 See CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND 
REGULATION 3 (1984), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE (microfiche no. 
J952-15 (1984)) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. 
3 The Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), protects wetlands and 
waters of the United States. See id. §§ 1311(a), 1344. The CWA's injunctive provisions 
authorize the government to seek restoration of illegally filled wetlands. See id. § 1319(b). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 698 (D.N.J. 1987) (purchasers 
without notice of the seller's illegal activity not liable for restoration); United States v. Tull, 
615 F. Supp. 610, 627 (E.D. Va. 1983), afl'd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other 
grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (defendant denied jury trial); United States v. Golden Acres, 
Inc., No. 76-0023, slip op. at 3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1977), summarized in 13 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,443; United States v. American Capital Land Corp., 8 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1654, 1656 (S.D. Miss. 1975). 
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Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA)5 is the principal vehicle 
for protecting wetlands in the United States. 6 All discharges of 
dredged or fill material into waters of the United States require a 
permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps), unless the CWA exempts a discharge. 7 The Corps regulates 
waters of the United States, which it broadly defines as navigable 
waters and non-navigable lakes, rivers, streams, ponds, and wet-
lands.s 
The Corps may seek an injunction to secure compliance with the 
CWA for unpermitted discharges or discharges in violation of an 
existing permit. 9 The injunction may either enjoin future filling ac-
tivities or order restoration of illegally filled wetlands to their pre-
filled condition. 10 By means of an injunction demanding restoration, 
a court may order removal of unauthorized material and replanting 
of an affected area with wetlands plants. 11 
When faced with a CWA violation, courts are not required to 
order restoration. 12 Rather, courts may use their equitable discretion 
to determine whether restoration is an appropriate remedy and to 
shape the nature of a restoration order. 13 Courts frequently have 
ordered restoration against landowners and developers who have 
filled wetlands on their property.14 Courts usually refuse to order 
restoration, however, against purchasers who buy property contain-
ing illegally filled wetlands but who have not performed the unau-
thorized activity. 15 
5 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
6 See id. § 1344. 
7 Id. §§ 1311(a), 1344. The CWA exempts farming, forestry, ranching activities, the main-
tenance of currently serviceable structures, and the construction of drainage ditches, tempo-
rary sedimentation basins, and farm or forest roads. Id. § 1344(f)(1). 
8 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a) (1990). See generally Liebesman, Clean Water Act's Section 404 
Dredged and Fill Material Discharge Permit Program-Significant Issues, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. 
NAT. RESOURCES l. 
9 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(s) (1988). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has delegated 
its authority to enforce unpermitted CWA violations to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). 
United States v. Ke1course, 721 F. Supp. 1472, 1478 (D. Mass. 1989). 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 627 (E.D. Va. 1983), afl'd, 769 F.2d 
182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev 'd. on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
11 See United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1180-
83 (D. Mass. 1986), afl'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); 
United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1983). 
12 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982). 
13 See id. at 32l. 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 698 (D.N.J. 1987); United States 
v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204, 1215 (W.D. Tenn. 1987); Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 
at 1183; Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1164. 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., No. 76-0023, slip op. at 3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 
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Judicial reluctance to hold purchasers liable for the restoration of 
illegally filled wetlands results in the loss of those wetlands, gives 
an economic gain to the purchaser or the seller, and sends a message 
to purchasers that they will not be liable for restoration after pur-
chasing illegally filled wetlands. Judicial reluctance to hold purchas-
ers liable also allows the continuing harm of the filled wetlands to 
remain unabated, thus violating the CWA's goal of protecting and 
restoring this nation's waters.16 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA)17 establishes purchaser liability for the 
cleanup of hazardous waste. For example, a purchaser is strictly 
liable for the cleanup of hazardous waste found on the purchaser's 
land, even if the purchaser did not cause or contribute to the dis-
charge of the hazardous material. 18 The liability of purchasers under 
CERCLA for the cleanup of hazardous waste supports holding pur-
chasers who knew or should have known about the existence of 
illegally filled wetlands on purchased property liable for restoration. 
This Comment argues that purchasers of illegally filled wetlands 
should be held liable for restoration in two situations: when a pur-
chaser has actual or constructive knowledge of illegally filled wet-
lands or when a purchaser fails to be duly diligent in his or her 
purchase. Purchasers who buy property without knowledge of ille-
gally filled wetlands and after making a diligent search for the ex-
istence of illegally filled wetlands should not be held liable for res-
toration. 
Section II of this Comment describes wetlands and their ecological 
value. Section III discusses the legislative history and strict liability 
standard of the CWA. Section IV describes judicial equitable discre-
tion in formulating remedies for CWA violations, the guidelines 
courts use in ordering restoration,19 and the liability of non-perform-
ing parties under the CWA. Section V discusses CERCLA hazardous 
waste liability and the requirement that purchasers exercise due 
diligence to detect hazardous waste. Section VI argues that the 
CW A's injunctive powers and the restoration case law authorize 
12, 1977), summarized in 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,443; United States v. 
American Capital Land Corp., 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1654, 1656 (S.D. Miss. 1975). 
16 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988); see also United States v. Carter, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1810, 1813 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (restoration is an authorized and appropriate remedy under the 
CWA). 
17 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). 
18 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). 
19 See United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
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courts to hold purchasers liable for the restoration of illegally filled 
wetlands. This section advocates that purchasers should be held 
liable for restoration when they have actual or constructive knowl-
edge of illegally filled wetlands when they purchase property or when 
they fail to be duly diligent in their purchase. 
II. WETLANDS AND THEIR ECOLOGICAL VALUE 
Wetlands are lands such as swamps, marshes, and bogs that are 
saturated with water.20 The Corps, the agency that regulates wet-
lands, defines wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or satu-
rated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration suf-
ficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, 
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil 
conditions."21 Wetlands consist of coastal saltwater wetlands or in-
land freshwater vegetated wetlands. 22 Inland wetlands usually occur 
adjacent to bodies of water, but drainage, precipitation, or ground 
water discharges can create isolated wetlands. 23 
Although wetlands used to be considered unproductive areas suit-
able only for filling and development,24 they actually serve many 
useful ecological and economic functions. 25 For instance, wetlands 
store rising flood waters and slowly release them as the flood waters 
subside. 26 Filling wetlands prevents flood storage and increases the 
level and velocity of flood waters.27 Wetlands also purify water by 
trapping toxic chemicals, excess nutrients, and other pollutants. 28 
The pollutants are either trapped and buried in the wetlands or are 
20 33 C.F.R. 328.3(b) (1990); J. KUSLER, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE: A PRO-
TECTION GUIDEBOOK 11 (1983). For a useful bibliography of wetlands literature, see Note, A 
Research Guide to Selected Wetlands Law and Policy Literature, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 
L. 435 (1988). 
21 33 C.F.R. 328.3(b) (1990). 
22 J. KUSLER, supra note 20, at 11. 
23 Id. Ninety-five percent of the United States' vegetated wetlands are inland wetlands. 
OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
24 OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. 
25 33 C.F.R. 320.4(b)(2) (1990). See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 271(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 86-
87, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1190-91. 
26 J. KUSLER, supra note 20, at 1. 
27 See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. The Corps determined that a 40% reduction in 
wetlands in a river basin in Massachusetts would cause a two-to-four foot increase in flood 
levels and cause $3 million in annual flood damage. Id. 
28 CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND 
REGULATION, SUMMARY 10 (1984), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 
(microfiche no. J952-16 (1984» [hereinafter OTA SUMMARY]; see also W. WANT, LAW OF 
WETLANDS REGULATION 2-3 (1989). 
1991] WETLANDS LIABILITY 323 
converted into less harmful forms by microorganisms contained in 
the wetlands. 29 
Wetlands are unique ecosystems that sustain a large variety of 
plants and animals. 30 Wetlands produce vegetative material that 
serves as an important source of food for commercial fish and shell-
fish. 31 Birds, especially migratory waterfowl, rely on wetlands for 
breeding and nesting. 32 Thirty-five percent of all endangered species 
depend on wetlands for survival. 33 
Despite the value of wetlands, they are being destroyed quickly. 
Thirty to fifty percent of the wetlands originally existing in the 
contiguous United States have been converted into non-wetlands 
upland areas.34 Wetlands are being lost at a rate of approximately 
550,000 acres per year.35 These losses are mostly agricultural con-
versions of inland wetlands. 36 People convert wetlands into uplands 
for a variety of reasons. Farmers are attracted to wetlands because 
of the rich soil. 37 Developers build in wetlands because of their open 
views38 and their relatively low cost, compared to upland building 
sites. 39 
To stop the dramatic loss of wetlands, a national committee of 
politicians, scientists, and bureaucrats recommended that the United 
States adopt a policy that there should be no net loss of wetlands. 40 
29 OTA SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 10. 
30 OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 39-41. 
31 J. KUSLER, supra note 20, at 1. The fish from the coastal continental shelf were valued 
at $520 million. Id. 
32 H.R. REP. No. 271(1), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86-87, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1191. 
33 J. KUSLER, supra note 20, at 3. 
34 OTA SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 6. Upland areas are dry areas that are not wetlands. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. Eighty percent of wetlands conversions are from agricultural conversions, six percent 
from urbanization, six percent from forestry and mining, and eight percent from the impound-
ment of water. I d. 
37 OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. 
38 Id. 
39 See Comment, Restoration of Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: An 
Analytical Synthesis of Statutory and Case Law Principles, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
295, 297 (1988) (written by Mark C. Rouvalis). 
40 NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION 
AGENDA 3 (1988) [hereinafter WETLANDS FORUM]. This goal usually is referred to as the "no 
net loss of wetlands" policy. In a recent Memorandum of Agreement between the Corps and 
EPA, the Corps states that, for wetlands, the Corps will "strive to achieve a goal of no overall 
net loss of values and functions." ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
§ 404(B)(I) GUIDELINES 2 (Feb. 6, 1990) [hereinafter WETLANDS MOA]. 
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Under this policy, wetlands losses would be avoided whenever pos-
sible. 41 When wetlands losses are unavoidable, the lost wetlands 
would be offset by restoring filled or polluted wetlands or by creating 
new wetlands. 42 Among other suggestions, the committee recom-
mended improved regulatory programs, enhanced enforcement, and 
increased restoration. 43 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE STRICT LIABILITY OF 
THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
A. CWA Legislative History 
The Clean Water Act (CWA),44 which amended the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCAA),45 regulates 
water pollution, including the filling of wetlands. 46 The CWA's goal 
is to protect and restore the nation's waters and wetlands, and, 
ultimately, to stop the discharge of all pollutants into United States 
waters. 47 
The original Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) gave 
the states primary responsibility to control water pollution and en-
force the Act.48 Although Congress required the states to develop 
water-quality standards for interstate waters,49 the federal govern-
ment's role was limited to providing the states with grants for treat-
ment plants and water pollution research. 50 
In 1972, Congress determined that many states had not created 
the mandatory water-quality standards and that the states were not 
41 WETLANDS FORUM, supra note 40, at 3. 
42 [d. at 4. 
43 [d. at 4-6 . 
.. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
45 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 (FWPCAA) amended the original Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(FWPCA) passed in 1948. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3669-70. 
46 See 33 U.S.C. 1342, 1344 (1988). The 1977 amendments to the FWPCA changed the 
name of the FWPCAA to the Clean Water Act. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 50, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4424, 4424-25. This 
comment refers to the water pollution control statute as the CWA, making reference to the 
predecessor FWPCA or FWPCAA as necessary. 
47 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). The Act protects wetlands by what is commonly referred to as 
the section 404 permit program. See id. § 1344. 
48 See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 3668, 3669-70. 
49 [d. at 3669. 
50 See id. 
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enforcing the Act. 51 Although the federal government had increased 
the amount of the state grants in an attempt to support state efforts 
to combat pollution,52 Congress grew increasingly worried about the 
effects of water pollution on public health. 53 Congress found that the 
nation's navigable waters were unfit for most purposes and that they 
were being used as disposal systems, instead of supporting life and 
health. 54 
To cure state inaction and to improve water quality, Congress 
amended the FWPCA in 1972 by passing the FWPCAA.55 The 
FWPCAA has broad and ambitious goals, which have been retained 
in the current CWA: "The objective of this chapter is to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters. "56 
The FWPCAA establishes a federal permitting program, called 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
jointly administered by the Corps and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). 57 Instead of state regulation of water pollution based 
on water-quality standards, the NPDES limits the amount of pol-
lutants that may be discharged from a point source. 58 While the EPA 
has the authority to issue NPDES permits for effluents under section 
402 of the CWA, the Corps has the authority to regulate the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material under section 404. 59 Although the 
Corps has primary permitting authority over wetlands, the Corps 
must issue permits according to guidelines developed by the EPA.60 
The EPA may veto a Corps permit if the EPA finds that the dis-
51 [d. at 3672. The FWPCA had an extremely cumbersome enforcement mechanism. See 
id. at 3669. Before enforcement proceedings could begin, a discharger could seek negotiations 
with the state government. [d. The Senate found a nearly total lack of enforcement of the 
FWPCA; only one case was brought to court during the life of the statute. [d. at 3672. 
62 [d. at 3670. 
53 [d. at 3674. 
54 [d. 
55 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3668,3672,3674. 
66 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). 
57 [d. § 1342. 
58 [d. §§ 1342(a)(I), 1362(12), (14). A point source is a discernible and confined conveyance 
of pollutants, which includes pipes, tunnels, ditches, and channels. [d. § 1362(14). For a short 
description of the 1972 FWPCAA and a more complete discussion of the CWA, see Hall, The 
Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 343 (1978). 
59 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988). The permits issued under this section of the CWA are usually 
called "section 404" permits or "dredge-or-fill" permits. 
60 [d. § 1344(b)(l). These guidelines are known as the section 404(b)(I) guidelines and are 
codified in 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1990). 
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charge has an unacceptable ecological impact. 61 According to a recent 
memorandum of agreement, the EPA shares enforcement duties 
with the Corps.62 
Originally, Congress did not envision that the FWPCAA would 
protect wetlands. 63 The primary focus of the FWPCAA was to pro-
tect navigable waters from the disposal of dredged or fill material. 64 
Accordingly, after Congress passed the FWPCAA, the· Corps only 
regulated navigable waters, its traditional jurisdiction under the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA).65 The Corps' refusal to 
regulate beyond navigable waters, however, was inconsistent with 
the FWPCAA's broad definition of navigable waters as being all 
waters of the United States. 66 In response to a suit challenging the 
Corps' limited interpretation of their jurisdiction, the District Court 
for the District of Columbia ruled, in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. CallawaY,67 that Congress meant to assert its ju-
risdiction to the fullest extent possible under the commerce clause. 68 
Therefore, the district court ordered the Corps to regulate all waters 
of the United States and not just navigable waters. 69 
After the Callaway decision, the Corps issued a press release 
stating that the district court's decision in Callaway increased its 
61 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1988). The EPA may use its veto when the Administrator of the 
EPA determines that a discharge of dredged or fill material has an unacceptable adverse 
impact on water supplies, shellfish beds, fishery areas, wildlife, or recreation areas. [d. 
62 The memorandum is reprinted in W. WANT, supra note 28, at App. 8-1. The memorandum 
established the Corps as the lead agency for section 404 enforcement, with EPA providing 
enforcement in special cases. See id. at 8-4 to 8-5. 
63 The Senate debate over section 404 centered on the effect of section 404 on commercial 
navigation. See 117 CONGo REC. 38,854 (1971) (comments of Senators Ellender and Muskie), 
reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972, at 1387-89 (1973) [hereinafter FWPCAA LEG. HIST.] (the FWPCAA LEG. 
HIST. is reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE (microfiche no. S 642-3 (1973))); 
see also Comment, supra note 39, at 295, 303 n.5l. For a history of the adoption of the 
FWPCA, see Ablard & O'Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance, 1 VT. L. 
REV. 51 (1976). 
64 See Comment, supra note 39, at 303. 
66 See Note, Wetland's Reluctant Champion: The Corps Takes a Fresh Look at "Navigable 
Waters," 6 ENVTL. L. 217, 218 (1975). 
66 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 
1975). Section 404, which gives the Corps authority to issue permits for the discharge of 
dredged or filled material into wetlands, uses the term "navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) 
(1988). The use of the term "navigable waters" in this section would lead one to think that 
Corps authority extends only to navigable waters. The CWA, however, broadly defines 
"navigable waters" as being all "waters of the United States." [d. § 1362(7). 
67 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). 
66 [d. at 686. 
69 [d. 
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jurisdiction to include all waters of the United States. 70 To illustrate 
its expanded jurisdiction, the Corps stated that farmers and ranchers 
might need to apply for a permit to build an irrigation ditch.71 Upon 
learning of the expanded Corps jurisdiction, agricultural interests 
flooded Congress with complaints about the Corps' expanded juris-
diction and the bureaucratic delays caused by the section 404 permit 
program. 72 
Responding to the complaints of farmers, ranchers, and forest-
ers,73 the House of Representatives passed a bill restricting Corps 
jurisdiction to navigable waters capable of transporting interstate 
commerce. 74 This bill also exempted farming, forestry, and ranching 
from the permitting requirement. 75 The Senate, however, rejected 
the House bill and maintained the Corps' broad jurisdiction over all 
waters of the United States. 76 
In 1977, when Congress amended the FWPCAA by passing the 
CWA, the Senate bill prevailed, and Congress preserved the Corps' 
broad jurisdiction over all waters of the United States. 77 Neverthe-
less, Congress provided that certain activities, such as farming, 
forestry, and ranching were exempt from the permitting require-
ment. 78 The CWA also created a system of general permits for 
activities that have minimal ecological impact. 79 If a permit applicant 
can qualify for a general permit, an individual permit is not re-
quired. 80 
70 See Note, supra note 65, at 219. 
71 Id. 
72 See 123 CONGo REC. 26,711 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bentson), reprinted in 4 A LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, at 902 (1978) [hereinafter CWA LEG. 
HIST.] (the CWA LEG. HIST. is reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE (mi-
crofiche no. S322-9 to S322-1O (1978))). 
73 See 123 CONGo REC. 10,428 (1977) (statement of Rep. Smith), reprinted in 4 CWA LEG. 
HIST., supra note 72, at 1347. 
74 H.R. RES. 3199, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(b) (1977), reprinted in 4 CWA LEG. HIST., 
supra note 72, at 1157. 
75 Id. § 16(h), reprinted in 4 CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 72, at 1159. 
76 See S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4326,4400. The report ofthe Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 
stated that restricting the jurisdiction of the Corps would cripple the CWA's objectives. Id. 
77 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362(7) (1988). The House and Senate bills are discussed in H.R. 
CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 97-100, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4326, 4472-75. 
78 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1988). 
79 See id. § 1344(e). In addition, the CWA allows the states to administer the section 404 
permit program subject to EPA approval. Id. § 1344(g), (h). 
80 33 C.F.R. 325.5 (1990). For a description of the section 404 permit program, see Blumm 
& Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, 
Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695 (1989). 
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Although Congress did not state specifically that its intent in 
passing the CWA was to protect wetlands, the legislative history of 
the CW A suggests that Congress intended the section 404 program 
to protect wetlands. 81 Congress rejected proposals to limit Corps 
jurisdiction severely, fearing that a limited Corps jurisdiction would 
jeopardize wetlands.82 In addition, the Senate Committee on the 
Environment and Public Works concluded that efforts to restrict 
Corps jurisdiction would make it impossible to achieve the CWA's 
objective of maintaining and restoring the nation's waters. 83 
After Congress passed the CWA, the Supreme Court held that 
the language, history, and policy of the CWA authorized the Corps 
to regulate wetlands. 84 Currently, Congress looks to the section 404 
program as the primary federal means to protect wetlands. 85 If there 
was any doubt when Congress passed the CWA, subsequent events 
have shown that Congress intends to protect wetlands through the 
section 404 permit program. 
B. CWA Strict Liability and Enforcement 
Sections 301 and 404 of the CWA create liability for unpermitted 
discharges of dredged or fill material into wetlands as well as for 
discharges in violation of a permit. 86 Section 301 states that "the 
81 123 CONGo REC. 26,697 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 4 CWA LEG. 
HIST., supra note 72, at 869. Senator Muskie stated that the destruction of wetlands was 
causing serious ecological damage to the waters of the United States. Id.; see also United 
States v. Hannah, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1068, 1080 (D. S.C. 1983). "Congress intended 
to include wetlands under the definition of navigable waters." Id. 
82 S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4326, 4400. Senators in favor of preserving broad Corps jurisdiction argued that a 
restricted Corps jurisdiction would affect wetlands severely. See 123 CONGo REC. 26,713 (1977) 
(statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 4 CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 72, at 909. Senator 
Hart argued that restricting the Corps' jurisdiction would remove 98% of the rivers, lakes, 
and streams, and 85% of the wetlands from federal protection. Id. 
83 S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4326, 4400; S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (stating that the section 404 
program is designed to end the unregulated destruction of wetlands), reprinted in 1977 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4326, 4400. 
84 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 140 (1985). 
85 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WETLANDS: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' SECTION 
404 PROGRAM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (1988), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION 
SERVICE (microfiche no. H641-30 (1989». For a more recent discussion of the section 404 
permit program and the ineffectiveness of the Corps' enforcement efforts, see Administration 
of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 1988: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations 
and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1988), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE, (microfiche no. H641-30 
(1989». 
86 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344 (1988). 
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discharge of any pollutant by any person" that does not comply with 
the CW A is illegal. 87 Accordingly, a discharge of dredged or fill 
material into wetlands must comply with section 404 of the CWA. 
To comply with section 404, a discharge must fall within an exemp-
tion, qualify for a general permit, or be permitted by an individual 
permit. 88 
Sections 301 and 404 do not create expressly any standard of 
liability. 89 Judicial decisions, however, have established that a person 
who discharges dredged or fill material into wetlands is strictly 
liable. 90 In United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,91 the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the regulatory sections of 
the CWA do not limit liability to intentional acts. 92 Rather, section 
301 merely states that any discharge not in compliance with the 
CWA is unlawful. 93 To establish liability, the CWA does not require 
scienter or a knowing violation of the CWA.94 
Sections 301 and 309 authorize the EPA and the Corps to seek 
injunctive relief or a civil penalty to remedy any CWA violation. 95 
Section 309(b) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to commence 
a civil action "for appropriate relief" for any violation of the CWA 
for which the Administrator is allowed to issue a compliance order 
under section 309(a).96 Section 309(a)(3) authorizes the Administrator 
to issue a compliance order to "any person" in violation of section 
301. 97 Section 301 states that the discharge of any pollutant by any 
person is illegal, unless the discharge complies with the CW A. 98 
Thus, if a discharge does not comply with the CWA, then section 
301 is violated, and the EPA may exercise its authority under section 
fIT Id. § 1311(a). 
88 Id. § 1344; see also 33 C.F.R. 320.1(c) (1990). 
89 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344 (1988). 
90 See, e.g., United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Md. 1982); United States v. Board of 
Trustees of Fla. Keys Community College, 531 F. Supp. 267, 274 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
91 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979). 
92 Id. at 374. 
93 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). 
94 Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 374. Strict liability, as it pertains to wetlands filling, means 
that liability arises from performing illegal activity or being responsible for illegal activity. 
Board of Trustees, 531 F. Supp. at 274. 
95 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319 (1988). 
96 Id. § 1319(b). In practice, the EPA and the Corps request that the United State!> 
Department of Justice bring suit against a CWA violator on behalf of the EPA or the Corps. 
W. WANT, supra note 28, at 8-4. 
97 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1988). 
98 Id. § 1311(a). 
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309 to issue a compliance order or to commence a civil action for 
appropriate relief. 99 
In assessing the CWA's civil penalties,100 some courts have pen-
alized defendants according to the number of days that illegal fill 
remains in wetlands, rather than penalizing the defendant merely 
for the number of days that a defendant engaged in illegal activi-
ties.lOl These courts treat illegally filled wetlands as a continuing 
CWA violation. l02 For example, in United States v. Cumberland 
Farms, Inc.,103 the District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
defined a day of violation as one during which a defendant uses 
machinery to fill wetlands or allows fill to remain in wetlands. 104 
Because illegally filled wetlands are a continuing CWA violation, 105 
the Corps or the EPA may seek restoration years after filling ac-
tually takes place. 106 In North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Wood-
bury, 107 the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina 
allowed a citizen's suit for restoration brought six years after the 
defendant placed illegal fill in wetlands. 108 The court allowed the suit 
because it determined that wetlands filling is a continuing CWA 
99 [d. §§ 1311(a), 1319(a), (b). Section 404 gives the Secretary of the Anny authority to 
commence only civil actions for violations of permits issued under section 404, id. § 1344(s), 
whereas the EPA has statutory authority to enforce any CWA violation. [d. § 1319(b). While 
the Corps does not have direct statutory authority to seek remedies for unpermitted dis-
charges, the EPA has delegated its enforcement authority over all CWA violations to the 
Corps. United States v. Kelcourse, 721 F. Supp. 1472, 1478 (D. Mass. 1989); see generally W. 
WANT, supra note 28, at 8-1 to 8-5. 
100 The CWA authorizes a $25,000 civil penalty for each day of violation. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(s)(4) (1988). 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 626 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 769 F.2d 
182 (4th Cir. 1985) (court considered both the days of the performance of the illegal activities 
and the days that the illegal fill remained in place), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 
(1987) (defendant denied a jury trial on liability). 
102 See North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Woodbury, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941, 1944 
(E.D.N.C. 1989); Tull, 615 F. Supp. at 626. 
103 647 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Mass. 1986), afl'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 1061 (1988). 
104 [d. at 1183; see also United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 700 (D. N.J. 1987) 
(violation occurs every day a defendant allows illegal fill to remain in wetlands). 
106 Woodbury, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1943. In Woodbury, the district court held that 
a defendant's failure to remove fill was a continuing CWA violation. [d. The court expressly 
applied this idea, which courts usually use in calculating civil penalties, to the restoration 
order. [d. at 1942-43. 
106 In Cumberland Farms, the circuit court upheld an enforcement action for restoration 
brought eight years after the defendant's first violation. 826 F.2d at 1161. The circuit court 
rejected the defendant's argument that the government was foreclosed equitably from bringing 
the action. [d. 
107 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
108 [d. at 1943. 
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violation.109 The court stated that the federal statute of limitations, 
which forbids the enforcement of civil penalties after five years, did 
not bar the action110 because the plaintiff was seeking injunctive 
relief and not a civil penalty.111 Instead, the equitable doctrine of 
laches applied. 112 Because the plaintiff diligently brought suit, the 
court ruled that laches did not bar the action. 113 
Although the FWPCA originally protected only navigable waters, 
the CWA now protects all waters of the United States, including 
wetlands. 114 Section 309 of the CWA authorizes the Corps and the 
EPA to seek injunctive relief to remedy CWA violations, which 
includes an order to restore illegally filled wetlands. 115 Courts have 
held that illegal fill remaining in wetlands is a continuing CWA 
violation.n6 Therefore, the Corps and the EPA may seek restoration 
years after a defendant fills wetlands. 
IV. EQUITABLE BALANCING, THE RESTORATION GUIDELINES, 
AND THE LIABILITY OF NON-PERFORMING PARTIES 
A. The Equitable Balancing of Statutory Violations 
The phrase "equitable balancing" describes a court's power to 
balance competing claims in order to effect justice.117 As a prereq-
uisite to exercising their equitable powers, courts usually require a 
finding that irreparable injury will result absent equitable action and 
that legal remedies are inadequate. 118 The Supreme Court has held 
that a court may exercise its equitable discretion when remedying 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1944; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988). 
111 Woodbury, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1944. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. The court in Woodbury stated that laches would bar an action if the plaintiffs failed 
to bring an action diligently and if the nature of the claim and the situation required diligence. 
Id. (citing Holmberg v. Armbrect, 327 U.S. 392 (1946». The Woodbury court held that laches 
does not involve a strict time bar to an action but is a question of whether a plaintiff equitably 
may bring suit. Id. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 81-85. 
115 See infra text accompanying notes 155-61. 
116 See supra text accompanying notes 100-113. 
117 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982); see generally Axline, 
Constitutional Implications of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies in Environmental 
Cases, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and 
Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 513 (1984); Plater, Statutory Violations and 
Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982); Comment, Equitable Discretion and 
Statutory Interpretation, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. (1991) (to be published). 
118 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313. 
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violations of the CW A and other statutes. 119 The Supreme Court 
rejected the principle that a court always should issue an injunction 
to remedy a statutory violation. 120 Instead, if Congress has not fore-
closed the use of equitable discretion explicitly, courts may use their 
equitable discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy to a statutory 
violation, which mayor may not include an injunction. 121 
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 122 the Supreme Court ruled 
that a court could not engage in equitable balancing when faced with 
a violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).123 The Hill Court 
affirmed a lower court order enjoining construction of a dam across 
a river in Tennessee. 124 Construction of the dam would result in the 
extermination of the snail darter, an endangered species of fish. 125 
The Court ruled that the ESA plainly prohibited construction of the 
dam because it would result in the eradication of the snail darter. 126 
Although the Hill Court acknowledged that a court need not issue 
an injunction for every violation of a statute, it ruled that, when 
faced with a clear congressional mandate for a course of action, a 
court's role is to enforce the congressional mandate and not review 
legislative decisions. 127 When faced with a law that creates a strict 
prohibition, such as the ESA, the court's discretion was limited to 
enforcing the act involved. l28 
In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,129 the Supreme Court rejected 
the principle that injunctions should issue automatically to cure CWA 
violations. 13o In Romero-Barcelo, the governor of Puerto Rico sued 
the Navy to enjoin the Navy's use of navigable waters off of Puerto 
Rico as a practice bombing range. 131 Puerto Rico claimed that the 
Navy was violating the CWA because it did not have an NPDES 
119 Id. at 321; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987) 
(district court did not have to issue an injunction to comply with a federal statute protecting 
the subsistence resources of Alaskan natives). 
120 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 321; see also Gambell, 480 U.S. at 544. 
121 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 321 
122 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
129 Id. at 195. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). 
124 Hill, 437 U.S. at 172. 
126 Id. 
126 Id. at 174-75. The Supreme Court ruled that building the dam would violate the ESA 
because it would disrupt the snail darter's habitat and most probably lead to the snail darter's 
extinction. Id. An injunction was the only way to protect the snail darter. Id. at 195. 
127 Id. at 194-95. 
129 Id. at 195. 
129 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
130 I d. at 315. 
131 Id. at 308. 
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permit to discharge munitions. 132 Ruling that it had an absolute duty 
to restrain CWA violations and that an injunction should issue au-
tomatically, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the 
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico's refusal to grant an 
injunction to stop the bombing. 133 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the First Circuit decision 
and approved of the district court's use of equitable balancing. l34 
The Supreme Court ruled that the principle set forth in Hill, of 
automatically issuing an injunction, was inapplicable to the CWA.135 
Equitable balancing was appropriate to remedy CWA violations be-
cause an injunction is not the only remedy for CWA violations136 and 
because the statutory framework and the legislative history of the 
CWA did not clearly circumscribe a court's equitable discretion. 137 
In fact, the Court found that the CWA, by implication, provided for 
equitable balancing and discretion in curing CWA violations. 138 
The Court held that the district court had the discretion to order 
the type of relief it considered necessary to achieve prompt compli-
ance with the CWA.139 The Supreme Court held that the district 
court could exercise its discretion and refuse to grant an injunc-
tion. 140 Although the district court had the power to enjoin the 
bombing immediately, the district court's remedies were not limited 
to injunctive relief. 141 The district court could weigh the harm to 
national defense against the harm to the environment and refuse to 
enjoin the Navy's munitions discharges. 142 
Although a court has equitable discretion to fashion remedies for 
CWA violations, the Supreme Court stated in Romero-Barcelo that 
a court cannot ignore a statutory violation. 143 A court must order 
132 [d. at 309. The CWA specifically includes munitions as a pollutant. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) 
(1988). 
133 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311-12. 
134 [d. at 321. 
185 [d. at 315. 
188 [d. The Court held that fines and criminal penalties were alternative remedies. [d. 
137 [d. at 317,320. 
188 [d. The Court was persuaded that Congress envisioned equitable balancing because the 
CWA allows the discharge of some pollutants and has a program of phased compliance. [d. at 
317-18. Additionally, the CWA requires immediate cessation of violations only if pollution 
endangers public health or welfare. [d. 
139 [d. at 321. 
140 [d. at 320. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. at 311. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court could overturn the district 
court only for an abuse of discretion and not for the mere exercise of equitable discretion. [d. 
at 321. 
143 See id. at 315 
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the relief necessary to achieve compliance with the CW A. 144 The 
Court indicated that the district court respected the purpose of the 
CWA because it did not ignore the statutory violation. 145 The district 
court ordered the Navy to apply for a permit and only allowed the 
Navy to discharge pollutants pending the EPA's consideration of the 
Navy's permit application. 146 
Because wetlands restoration is achieved through an injunctive 
order,147 which is based in a court's equitable powers, equitable 
discretion allows courts to refuse to order restoration altogether and 
to modify proposed restoration orders. 148 Nevertheless, many courts 
have ordered restoration using equitable balancing, and the Supreme 
Court's decision in Romero-Barcelo has not prevented courts from 
issuing wetlands restoration orders. 149 For example, in United States 
v. Lofgren,150 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
rejected the defendant's argument that, according to Romero-Bar-
celo, the government was required to make a clear showing of ir-
reparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies before the 
government could obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain CWA 
violations. 151 
The Lofgren court ruled that equitable balancing and the concepts 
of irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies "should be 
exercised with flexibility and with sensitivity to the larger public 
interest at play. "152 Applying the traditional standard for a prelimi-
nary injunction with a sensitivity to the public interest, the district 
court held that an injunction should issue. 153 The court found that 
144 Id. at 318, 320. 
145 Id. at 316. The Supreme Court implied that the district court might have had to issue 
an injunction if the Corps denied the Navy a permit to discharge the munitions. See id. 
146 Id. at 310. 
147 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988). The CWA does not authorize restoration expressly, but 
courts have inferred the power to order restoration from the Corps' and the EPA's authority 
to seek a temporary or permanent injunction to restrain CWA violations. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(b) (1988); see also United States v. Carter, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1810, 1813 (S.D. 
Fla. 1982). "Restoration is an authorized and appropriate remedy under the Clean Water 
Act." Id. 
148 For a full discussion of how equitable discretion undermines the purposes of the CWA, 
see Comment, supra note 39, at 295. 
149 See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D. N.J. 1987); 
United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157 (M.D. Fla. 1983). 
150 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,164 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (the government sought a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant from filling wetlands to build a condominium). 
151 Id. at 20,166. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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there was a likelihood of success, an irreparable injury to the permit 
process, a lack of harm to others, and that an injunction would serve 
the public interest. 154 
B. The Restoration Guidelines-The Weisman Tests 
Although the CW A does not require explicitly the restoration of 
illegally filled wetlands, courts have inferred the power to order 
restoration from the EPA's statutory authority to seek a permanent 
or temporary injunction to remedy CWA violations. 155 In United 
States v. Weisman,156 the District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida held that two prerequisites must be satisfied before a court 
may consider a restoration order.157 The property to be subject to 
the order must be within CWA jurisdiction, and a court must conduct 
a hearing to consider the benefits, detriments, and alternatives to 
the restoration plan. 158 If these prerequisites are met, a court should 
consider the propriety of a restoration plan by using three criteria. 159 
A restoration plan must confer the maximum environmental benefits, 
must be practically achievable, and must bear an equitable relation-
ship to the wrong it is supposed to remedy. 160 The Weisman require-
ments, which other courts have followed,161 allow courts to consider 
a broad range of non-environmental equitable factors, such as harm 
154 Id.; see also United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 499 (D. N.J. 1984) (restoration 
would be in the public interest because it was "axiomatic" that strict enforcement of the CWA 
was necessary to achieve the objectives of the Act). 
155 See United States v. Carter, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1810, 1812-13. (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
The EPA's and the Corps's authority to seek an injunction is contained in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), 
1344(s) (1988). 
156 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
157 Id. at 1342-43. The court in Weisman derived its tests from earlier cases ordering the 
restoration of illegally dredged canals. Id.; see Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States 
Army Corps of Eng'g, 526 F.2d 1302, 1304 (5th Cir. 1976), on remand, 545 F. Supp. 721 (S.D. 
Fla. 1982) (restoration hearing); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 
1301 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Tripp & Hertz, Wetland Preservation and Restoration: 
Changing Federal Priorities, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 21 (1988); Want, Federal Wetlands 
Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 46-53 (1984). For a historical 
discussion of restoration, see Haagensen, Restoration as a Federal Remedy for Illegal Dredg-
ing and Filling Operations, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105 (1977). 
158 United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. These tests are commonly called the Weisman tests or guidelines. 
161 E.g., United States v. Cumberland Farms, 826 F.2d 1151, 1164 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); United States v. Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. 116, 122 (D.N.J. 1984), 
afl'd mem., 772 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986); United States v. 
Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 884, 885-86 (D. Md. 1982). 
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to the defendant, in addition to the harm to the environment. Courts 
may consider non-environmental factors in each of the three tests. 
1. Maximum Environmental Benefits 
In United States v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., the District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts considered whether the restoration 
of a cedar swamp that the defendant illegally converted into farm 
land would confer the maximum environmental benefits. 162 To deter-
mine whether a restoration plan offered the maximum environmental 
benefits, the district court weighed the detriments of the plan, the 
destruction of 110 acres of farm land and the possibility of damage 
to neighboring homes and farm land, against the benefits of the plan, 
improved flood control, water quality, and animal habitat. 163 The 
Cumberland Farms court stated that courts should favor restoration 
unless the detriments of restoration significantly outweigh the ben-
efits.164 The district court ruled that the restoration plan conferred 
maximum environmental benefits, that it was in the national inter-
est, and that it was consistent with both the controlling law and the 
legislative intent of preserving wetlands. 165 
Although the Cumberland Farms court favored restoration, it did 
not confine its analysis to a consideration of the environmental merits 
of the restoration plan. The district court also considered the non-
environmental consequences of the harm to abutters and the harm 
to agricultural production. Although the court did not ignore envi-
ronmental effects, it had the flexibility to consider non-environmen-
tal factors, many of which weighed against a restoration order. 166 
2. Practicality 
The practicality test involves a consideration of whether a resto-
ration plan is possible and a consideration of the cost of the resto-
ration plan to the defendant. The Weisman court ruled that a res-
toration plan that theoretically provides the maximum 
environmental benefits also has to be achievable as a practical matter 
and must be cost-effective. 167 
162 [d. at 1181; see supra note 103. 
163 [d. at 1181-82. 
164 [d. at 1182. 
165 [d. 
166 See id. at 1181. The Weisman court weighed the environmental benefits of two resto-
ration plans very carefully and considered the cumulative environmental effects of the pro-
posals. United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1346-48 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
167 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1348; see also United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 
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In assessing the cost-effectiveness of a restoration plan, courts 
have considered the financial effect of restoration on a defendant. 168 
In United States v. Robinson,169 the District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida carefully calculated the cost of restoration and 
the financial resources of the defendant. 17o One of the reasons the 
court ordered restoration was that the defendant had adequate re-
sources to restore the wetlands. 171 
Alternatively, the financial effect of a restoration order on a de-
fendant may weigh against restoration. 172 In United States v. Heub-
ner,173 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to order 
restoration of an illegally filled wetlands because restoration would 
destroy the defendant's cranberry bog, which was worth $400,000. 174 
The court also refused to order restoration because it stated that 
cranberry bogs were ecologically compatible with wetlands. 175 The 
court denied restoration of the cranberry bog even though the de-
fendant created the cranberry bog in violation of a consent decree 
that the defendant had entered into voluntarily.176 
3. Equity 
Some courts have refused to order restoration when they have 
considered the third Weisman requirement that restoration be eq-
uitable in light of the degree and kind of wrong. This test allows a 
1164 (M.D. Fla. 1983). In Cumberland Farms, the district court approved a restoration plan 
even though it found that the plan had an element of uncertainty. Cumberland Farms, 647 
F. Supp. at 1182. 
168 United States v. Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. 116, 123 (D.C. N.J. 1984), aff'd mem., 772 
F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986); Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1164. 
169 570 F. Supp. 1157 (M.D. Fla. 1983). 
170 [d. at 1164-65. 
171 [d. The district court found that the defendant could finance the restoration through the 
savings in his bank account and by selling a house trailer. [d. at 1164. 
172 See United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 
(1985). This is not to say that all courts will refuse to order restoration upon a finding of some 
burden to the defendant. Courts sometimes are willing to order restoration at great cost to 
the defendant. See United States v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1180 (D. 
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988). 
173 752 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985). 
174 [d. at 1245. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. The Heubner court also was influenced by the possibility that the defendants might 
have been able to get a permit for the bog expansion and the failure of Corps officials to take 
action when they knew about the expansion. [d. at 1245. 
In United States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984), the District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida refused to order restoration in one wetlands area finding that the 
burden on the defendant outweighed the environmental benefit. [d. at 372. The district court 
did order restoration, however, for a wetlands area that would not be burdensome to restore. 
[d. at 374. 
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court broad flexibility to consider various equitable factors that may 
weigh against restoration. For example, in United States v. Board 
of Trustees of Florida Keys Community College,177 a community 
college filled wetlands containing mangrove trees and vegetation that 
served as wildlife habitat,178 causing serious environmental harm.179 
Nevertheless, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
refused to order restoration because, among other factors, the court 
found that the violation was negligent and not willful, that the wet-
lands were unattractive, and that the defendant could create an 
artificial wetlands to mitigate the harmful environmental effects of 
the violation. 180 The district court also considered the defendant's 
lack of willfulness in violating the CW A even though, for establishing 
liability for CWA violations, courts have found that the CWA is a 
strict liability statute. 181 
Courts also have considered the expense of a restoration plan and 
the hardship that a plan would have on a defendant. For example, 
in United States v. Michael's Construction Company of Florida, 
Inc. ,182 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled against 
the government's proposed restoration plan, which cost $793,414, 
because it was too speculative and too costly. 183 Although the defen-
dant did not have to restore the site, the defendant did have to 
provide an alternative environmental area comparable to the de-
stroyed area. 184 
These cases show that courts have considered many non-environ-
mental factors in deciding whether to order restoration. 185 Courts 
177 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
178 Id. at 271-72. 
179 I d. at 275. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 274. The defendant had to pay a civil fine and develop an area to replace the 
illegally filled wetlands. Id. at 275. But see United States v Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 844, 886 
(D. Md. 1982) (the court ordered restoration for an unintentional violation because the CWA 
is a strict liability statute). 
In establishing liability for CWA violations, courts adhere to the strict liability of the CWA 
and do not consider the intent of the defendant. In the remedy phase, however, in deciding 
whether to order restoration, courts have considered the intent of the defendant. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 698 (D.N.J. 1987);' United States v. Tull, 615 
F. Supp. 610, 626 (E.D. Va. 1983), afl'd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 
481 U.S. 412 (1987) (defendant denied a jury trial on liability); United States v. Weisman, 489 
F. Supp. 1331, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 1980). The third Weisman test requires a consideration of the 
willfulness of the defendant by calling upon courts to determine whether restoration is justified 
in light of the degree and kind of wrong. See Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1349. 
182 772 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987) (defendant 
denied a jury trial on liability). 
183 Id. at 1504, 1507. 
184 I d. at 1507. 
185 See supra notes 155-84 and accompanying text. 
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have denied restoration for a variety of reasons: that a violation was 
merely negligent and not willful,186 that wetlands were filled to create 
a use that· is deemed compatible with wetlands,187 and that a resto-
ration plan is too costly. ISS The Weisman guidelines give courts 
considerable latitude to weigh a broad range of equities that fre-
quently may weigh against a restoration order. 
C. The Judicial Reluctance to Hold Purchasers Liable 
In wetlands cases, courts carefully protect the interests of inno-
cent purchasers. Courts usually refuse to order innocent purchasers 
to restore illegally filled wetlands,189 and they modify restoration 
plans to protect the interests of innocent purchasers and abutters. 
For example, in United States v. Golden Acres, Inc. ,190 the District 
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina refused to order 
restoration against innocent purchasers. 191 The defendant, Golden 
Acres, created conveyable lots, which it sold to innocent purchasers, 
by filling wetlands illegally.192 The court noted that the purchasers 
were unaware that the fill was illegal, and that they took no part in 
the illegal filling. 193 The court, however, fined the defendant so that 
it would not profit from the sale of the illegally filled lots. 194 
186 United States v. Board of Trustees of Fla. Keys Community College, 531 F. Supp. 267, 
275 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
187 United States v. Heubner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 
(1985). 
188 United States v. Michael's Constr. Co. of Fla., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985), 
vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987). 
189 See, e.g., United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., No. 76-0023, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 
12, 1977), summarized in 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,443 (1977); United States v. 
American Capital Land Corp., 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1654 (S.D. Miss. 1975). 
190 No. 76-0023, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.C. 1977), summarized in 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 20,443 (1977). 
191 Id. at 7. 
192 Id. at 2--3. 
193 Id. at 3. 
194 Id. at 7. The court ordered the defendant to restore two areas that he had filled illegally, 
but not conveyed. Id. at 6. In United States v. American Capital Land, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1654 (S.D. Miss. 1975), the defendant dredged a canal in a marsh and deposited the 
dredged material in wetlands. Id. at 1655. The defendant, planning to create a recreational 
and residential subdivision, sold lots along the canal as waterfront property to innocent 
purchasers. I d. The government demanded total restoration of all the fill that the defendant 
had placed, even though the defendant had conveyed the lots to the innocent purchasers. See 
id. The District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi refused to approve the govern-
ment's restoration plan because it would punish the innocent purchasers. Id. at 1656. The 
court characterized the sales as negligent but did not provide any detail as to the circumstances 
of the sales. Although American Capital Land and Golden Acres, Inc. involved violations of 
§ 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), their precedents are applicable to wetlands 
protected under § 404 of the CW A. Courts have looked to cases involving violations of § 10 
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In United States v. Ciampitti,195 the defendant, Ciampitti, sold 
two residential lots that contained areas of illegally filled wetlands. 196 
The District Court for the District of New Jersey refused to order 
removal of the fill from these lots because the lots had been trans-
ferred to innocent bona fide purchasers197 and because restoration 
would have involved removal of the purchasers' homes. 198 Given the 
purchasers' innocence and the harm that the restoration of the ille-
gally filled wetlands would cause the purchasers, the court found 
that removal of the fill would be inequitable to the purchasers. 199 
Courts often modify restoration plans in order to protect innocent 
purchasers and abutters. For example, in United States v. Moretti,200 
a developer, Moretti, dredged canals in navigable waters and used 
the dredged material to fill tidal wetlands to create a mobile home 
subdivision. 201 Each lot in the subdivision had access to Florida Bay, 
a navigable water,202 by way of the illegally dredged canals. After 
the dredging, Moretti conveyed lots in one half of the development 
but not in the other half.203 Not wishing to create a hardship on the 
innocent, but negligent,204 purchasers, the District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida ordered Moretti to fill the canals com-
pletely and remove the unauthorized fill from the wetlands in the 
parcel that had not been conveyed, but ordered Moretti only to fill 
partially the canals in the area that had been conveyed to the inno-
cent purchasers. 205 By only ordering Moretti to fill partially the 
of the RHA in deciding cases involving violations of § 404 of the CWA. See, e.g., United 
States v. Carter, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1810, 1812 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United States v. 
Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
195 669 F. Supp. 684 (D. N.J. 1987). 
196 Id. at 689. 
197 I d. at 698. The court ordered the defendant to restore the illegally filled wetlands on 
the lots that had not been conveyed. Id. The defendant also had to pay a civil penalty of 
$235,000. Id. at 700. 
198 Id. at 698. For one of the lots, the wetlands line went through the purchaser's dining 
room. Id. at 689. 
199 I d. at 698. 
200 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971), vacated in part, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), on 
remand, 387 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 526 F.2d 1306 (5th 
Cir.), on remand, 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976), vacated and remanded mem., 592 F.2d 
1189 (5th Cir. 1979). Moretti involved a violation of § 10 of the RHA, but its precedent is 
applicable to CWA violations. See supra note 194. 
201 Moretti, 331 F. Supp. at 153-54. 
202 Id. 
203 Moretti, 387 F. Supp. at 1404, 1407. 
204 The purchasers were negligent because they bought their parcels after the government 
filed a lis pendens. Id. Because of increasing environmental enforcement, however, the court 
stated that there would be no such compassion in the future. Id. 
205 I d. Shallow canals are more beneficial environmentally than deep canals because shallow 
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canals in the lots that he had conveyed, the district court made 
certain that the restoration order would not interfere with the pur-
chasers' use of the canals. 206 
While some courts have been reluctant to injure innocent pur-
chasers and either have refused to order restoration altogether or 
have modified restoration orders so as not to harm innocent parties, 
other courts have been more willing to order restoration that might 
affect innocent parties adversely. In United States v. Cumberland 
Farms, Inc., the District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
ordered the defendant to restore all the wetlands it had filled after 
July 1, 1977, the date when the Corps asserted jurisdiction over 
wetlands.207 The court ordered restoration of the filled wetlands even 
though there was a possibility, but not a likelihood, that the resto-
ration order would damage nearby cranberry bogs and flood nearby 
homes. 208 The court found that there was a distinct possibility that 
the restoration order would flood basements and ruin the septic 
systems of these homes. 209 These homes, built after 1977, would also 
suffer because the restored wetlands would be a mosquito breeding 
ground. 210 
Even though the district court found that the abutting home-
owners built their homes in complete good faith and without any 
knowledge that the defendant was filling illegally,211 the district court 
held that the plan was equitable because the homes were built after 
the Corps claimed jurisdiction over wetlands. 212 These homeowners, 
like people who build in violation of zoning laws of which they know 
nothing, had to bear the risk that the law would be enforced.213 The 
canals support more aquatic life. See Moretti, 331 F. Supp. at 156. Therefore, Mr. Moretti 
had to raise the level of the canals. See id. 
206 See Moretti, 423 F. Supp. at 1201. Even though the canals would be partially filled, the 
lot owners still could use the canals for swimming, fishing, and for access to Florida Bay. Id. 
207 United States v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1183 (D. Mass. 1986), 
aff'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), em. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988). 
208 Id. at 1181. The district court indicated that it might have ruled against restoration if 
there was a greater possibility that the abutters would be injured. See id. 
209 Id. Flooded septic systems would be especially serious because the town had no sewage 
system. Id. If the septic system flooded, the value of the homes would be reduced greatly. 
Id. 
210 Id. Even with a possibility that abutters would face flooding of cellars and an increased 
mosquito population, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved the district court's 
restoration plan. Cumberland Farms, 826 F.2d at 1165; see also United States v. Edwards, 
667 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (violations of the CWA "may be remedied even if 
other property in the immediate area is affected"). 
211 Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1183. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
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district court modified the restoration order so as not to harm the 
nearby cranberry bogs because the cranberry bogs existed before 
the Corps claimed jurisdiction over wetlands and because the cran-
berry bogs would qualify for an agricultural exemption to the 
CWA.214 
D. The Liability of Non-Performing Parties Under the CWA 
Courts usually hold parties who have performed unauthorized 
activity liable for the restoration of illegally filled wetlands. A typical 
wetlands enforcement action involves parties, such as landowners 
and developers, who have performed unauthorized activity on their 
own property. A number of courts, however, also have held non-
performing parties, people who have not actually performed illegal 
activity, liable for the restoration of illegally filled wetlands.215 
In United States v. Robinson, the District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida held a purchaser who tried to evade Corps juris-
diction liable for restoration because the purchaser had actual and 
constructive knowledge of the existence of illegally filled wetlands 
on the purchased property.216 Garland Robinson violated the CWA 
by placing fill in wetlands before receiving a Corps permit. 217 The 
government filed suit against Garland Robinson and his wife, Er-
nestine, and filed a lis pendens218 against their property.219 Shortly 
after the United States filed the suit and the lis pendens, the Rob-
insons conveyed their property to their cousin, Bradley Robinson. 220 
Garland Robinson, claiming that his wife had no interest in the 
property, then had his wife stipulated out of the lawsuit. 221 Ernestine 
then purchased the property from Bradley in an apparent attempt 
to evade Corps jurisdiction.222 
214 [d. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the restoration plan, ruling that the district 
court had protected adequately the abutter's interests. Cumberland Farms, 826 F.2d at 1165. 
The court noted that the evidence showed that there was only a minimal possibility of basement 
or septic flooding. [d. 
215 See United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204, 1215 (W.D. Tenn. 1987); United 
States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366, 374 (M.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Robinson, 570 
F. Supp. 1157, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1983). 
216 [d. at 1164; see supra note 169. 
217 [d. at 1160. 
218 A lis pendens is a public notice filed to alert all persons that title to property is in 
litigation and that purchasers may be bound by an adverse judgment. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 840 (5th ed. 1979). 
219 Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1162. 
220 [d. 
221 [d. 
222 [d. at 1162, 1164. 
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The district court held that these elusive transfers would not 
render Ernestine immune from liability for the restoration of the 
illegally filled wetlands because she had actual and constructive no-
tice of the lawsuit before acquiring title to the property.223 She had 
actual knowledge because she knew about the lawsuit filed by the 
United States, and she had constructive knowledge from the lis 
pendens that was on record. 224 
A landowner's knowledge that another party has placed unau-
thorized fill in wetlands on the landowner's property also may estab-
lish liability for the restoration of illegally filled wetlands. In United 
States v. Lambert,225 William Lambert placed fill on land, owned 
jointly with his wife Lucille, containing wetlands. 226 The District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida imposed a civil penalty on 
Mr. Lambert and ordered him to restore part of his property.227 The 
court also held Mrs. Lambert subject to the restoration order be-
cause she was aware of the illegal filling.228 The court refused to 
impose a civil penalty on Mrs. Lambert, however, because she did 
not actually direct or cause the filling.229 To enforce Mr. Lambert's 
civil penalty, the court placed an equitable lien for the amount of the 
civil penalty on Mrs. Lambert's interest in the property. 230 
In United States v. Edwards,231 the District Court for the Western 
District of Tennessee held a landowner who did not perform illegal 
activity, but who inherited property that contained illegally filled 
wetlands, liable for restoration. 232 In Edwards, Joseph Carter con-
structed unauthorized drainage· ditches and levees that damaged 
223 [d. at 1164. 
224 [d. at 1162. 
225 589 F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984). 
226 [d. at 374. 
227 [d. 
228 [d. A court probably would not find that knowledge of illegal filling alone would result 
in liability. If this were true, a landowner could be liable if a third party dumped illegal fill 
on a landowner's property without permission. A court probably would require some evidence 
of tacit permission, acquiescence, or financial benefit of the landowner to hold the landowner 
liable. See id.; see also Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1165. 
229 Lambert, 589 F. Supp. at 374. 
230 [d. The CWA, unlike CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988), does not authorize a lien to 
enforce payment for restoration. A court may place an equitable lien, however, on corporate 
real estate and on corporate assets. See United States v. Moretti, 423 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 
(S.D. Fla. 1976), vacated and remanded mem., 592 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1979). The Corps also 
may perform the restoration and look to the responsible party for recovery. See W. WANT, 
supra note 28, at 12-6. 
231 667 F. Supp 1204 (W.D. Tenn. 1987). 
232 [d. at 1215. 
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three hundred acres of wetlands on his property.233 The government 
brought suit against Carter seeking civil penalties and a restoration 
order, but Carter died before final judgment.234 His wife, Elizabeth 
Carter, inherited the property and claimed that the civil penalty 
should not survive the death of her husband.235 
After a lengthy analysis, the court ruled that, because the civil 
penalty was penal in nature, it did not survive Carter's death. 236 
Without much discussion, however, apparently assuming that the 
remedial, and not penal, nature of the restoration order meant that 
the injunction order survived Joseph Carter's death, the court held 
Elizabeth Carter liable for the restoration of the illegally filled wet-
lands. 237 The court noted that the restoration would be inexpensive 
because Elizabeth Carter had the necessary equipment to perform 
the restoration. 238 She would only have to remove levees and fill in 
drainage ditches, rather than removing large amounts of fi11. 239 
V. PURCHASER LIABILITY FOR THE CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE UNDER CERCLA 
CERCLA imposes strict liability for the costs of hazardous waste 
cleanup.240 To avoid liability, purchasers must conduct a duly diligent 
233 [d. at 1205. 
234 [d. 
236 [d. at 1211. Mrs. Carter was joined in the suit both as executrix of Mr. Carter's estate 
and individually when she inherited the property. [d. at 1205. 
236 [d. at 1214. The court relied upon the common-law principle that penal actions cease 
upon the death of the responsible party. [d. at 1212. 
237 [d. at 1214. 
238 [d. at 1210. 
239 [d. Courts may be able to hold non-performing parties liable for illegally filled wetlands 
or force landowners to allow a third party to restore wetlands on the landowner's property 
under the All Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988). The All Writs Act states: "The 
Supreme Court and all courts established by Acts of Congress may issue all writs necessary 
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles 
of law." [d.; see-also United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 171-78 (1977). 
The Supreme Court stated that the All Writs Act "extends, under appropriate circumstances, 
to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a 
position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper implementation of 
justice." [d.; see also Mumford Cove Ass'n v. Town of Groton, 647 F. Supp. 671, 688, 693 (D. 
Conn. 1986) (court restrained actions of town of Groton, its officials, and all persons who 
received actual notice of the court's order from interfering with prior court decisions demand-
ing compliance with the CWA). But cf. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 
U.S. 375, 401 (1982) (All Writs Act did not impose liability on the Buildings Contractors 
Association to aid in curing past discrimination). 
240 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(32), 9607(a), (b) (1988). 
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investigation to detect hazardous waste before they buy property. 241 
This due diligence requirement for hazardous waste suggests that 
purchasers of illegally filled wetlands may be held liable for resto-
ration if they do not conduct a duly diligent investigation to detect 
illegally filled wetlands before purchasing property. 
In response to public concern over the toxic waste problem, Con-
gress passed CERCLA to promote the cleanup of existing toxic 
waste disposal sites.242 CERCLA created a fund (now called "The 
Hazardous Substance Superfund") to pay for the cleanup of hazard-
ous substances.243 CERCLA mandates that the government should 
commence a cleanup using money from the fund and then look to 
private parties to recover cleanup costS.244 In passing CERCLA, 
Congress intended that those responsible for pollution should pay 
for all of the costs associated with the cleanup of pollution.245 
Under CERCLA, four classes of people face liability for cleanup 
costs: the current owner of a facility,246 the owner at the time of the 
disposal of the hazardous waste, the generator of the hazardous 
waste, and the transporter of the waste.247 Because CERCLA de-
fines "liability" by referring to the strict liability established by a 
section of the Clean Water Act that regulates the release of oil and 
hazardous substances, defendants face strict liability.248 Congress 
believed that strict liability would achieve the goal of making those 
241 See infra text accompanying notes 263-68. 
242 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6119-20. Congress was reacting partly in response to 
the public furor created over the hazardous waste contamination found at Love Canal. See 
Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 385 
(1988). 
243 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). 
244 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see also J. MOSKOWITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
AND REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 47 (1989). 
245 See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 2 H. NEEDHAM & M. 
MENEFEE, SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 483 (1984) (published by the Environmental 
Law Institute) [hereinafter SUPERFUND LEG. HIST.]. 
246 CERCLA defines "facility" as any building, structure, site, or area where a hazardous 
substance has been deposited, disposed of, or otherwise come to be located. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) 
(1988). 
247 I d. § 9607(a). 
248 Id. § 9601(32). Section 311 regulates the discharge of oil and hazardous waste and does 
not establish strict liability for § 404 wetlands violations and other CWA violations. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1321 (1988). Congress was aware that by referring to § 311 of the Clean W~ter Act 
they were establishing a strict liability standard. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); 126 CONGo REC. 11,787 (1980), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND 
LEG. HIST., supra note 245, at 164; 126 CONGo REC. 14,963 (1982), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND 
LEG. HIST., supra note 245, at 168. 
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who benefit financially from the production of hazardous waste bear 
its costS.249 
Although CERCLA imposes strict liability, it also contains three 
defenses to liability: acts of God, acts of war, or acts or omissions of 
third parties. 250 In order for a defendant to assert the third-party 
defense successfully, CERCLA has three requirements: the third 
party must not be an employee or an agent of the defendant;251 the 
release of the hazardous waste may not occur in connection with a 
contractual relationship between the defendant and the third 
party;252 and the defendant must establish that he or she exercised 
due care with the hazardous substance and took precautions against 
foreseeable acts of third parties. 253 
The third-party defense appears to provide an avenue of escape 
from liability. Courts, however, have been reluctant to grant the 
third-party defense. 254 For example, in New York v. Shore Realty 
COrp.,255 the defendant realty corporation acquired a parcel for de-
velopment that contained 700,000 gallons of hazardous waste placed 
there by the previous owner.256 The defendant argued that it met 
the requirements of the third-party defense because the previous 
owner was a third party who had discharged the waste.257 The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the defendant could not 
use the third-party defense because the acts and omissions of the 
third party occurred not during the defendant's ownership, but prior 
to the defendant's ownership. 258 
In addition to interpreting the third-party defense narrowly, 
courts also hold landowners liable for the cleanup of hazardous waste 
249 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1979), reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND LEG. HIST., 
supra note 245, at 482. 
260 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). 
261 [d. § 9607(b)(3). 
262 [d. 
263 [d. Although the Semite and House reports show that Congress was concerned about 
holding liable those who caused or financially benefitted from waste disposal, there does not 
seem to be an intent to hold innocent parties liable. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
13 (1979), reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND LEG. HIST., supra note 245, at 483; H.R. REP. No. 
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33 (1980), reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 245, at 445. 
264 See Glass, supra note 242, at 395-96. 
256 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
266 [d. at 1038. Shore Realty was aware that hazardous waste was being stored on the 
parcel it purchased. [d. 
267 [d. at 1048. 
268 [d. The circuit court found that the acts or omissions of a third party had to occur during 
the ownership or operation of the defendant, even though this limitation is not contained in 
the language of CERCLA. See J. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 244, at 124. 
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regardless of causation. 259 In Shore Realty, the circuit court ruled 
that CERCLA imposes liability regardless of an owner's causation 
of, or contribution to, the discharge of hazardous waste. 260 The circuit 
court held Shore Realty liable as a current owner of the site even 
though the corporation neither had been a cause of, nor had contrib-
uted to, the discharge of the hazardous waste. 261 Another court held 
a lessor of a site containing hazardous waste liable for cleanup costs 
even though the lessor merely owned the property and had not 
contributed to the discharge of the hazardous waste. 262 
In response to this rigid liability, Congress amended the third-
party defense by passing the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA).263 SARA allows innocent landown-
ers to use the third-party defense if they purchase contaminated 
property after the disposal of hazardous waste and if they did not 
know, and had no reason to know, about the presence of the hazard-
ous waste. 264 To meet this requirement, the defendant must have 
undertaken all appropriate inquiries of the previous uses and own-
ership of the property consistent with good commercial practice. 265 
Accordingly, SARA envisions that a landowner must engage in a 
diligent search for hazardous waste before purchase to qualify for 
the defense, a so-called "due diligence" search. 266 A due diligence 
search may involve a site investigation to spot hazardous waste 
problems, a historical review of a site, a search of agency files to 
259 See J. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 244, at 49; Glass, supra note 242, at 396. 
260 Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. See generally Comment, The Practical Significance of 
the Third-Party Defense Under CERCLA, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 (1988). 
261 Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. 
262 United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1984). 
The owner could not use the third-party defense because the owner had a contractual rela-
tionship, a lease, with the discharger of the hazardous waste. Id. 
263 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 
2d Sess. 186-88, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3276,3279-80. 
264 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). 
265 Id. § 9601(35)(B). To determine what constitutes an appropriate inquiry, SARA states 
that a court shall consider a number of factors: any specialized knowledge of the defendant, 
the ability of an inspection to detect the contamination, the obviousness of the contamination, 
common or easily discernible information about the contamination, and the difference between 
the purchase price of the property and the value of the property if uncontaminated. Id. In 
addition, a district court found that commercial transactions are to be held to the highest 
standard of liability, private transactions to be less strict, and inheritances and bequests the 
least strict standard of liability. United States V. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 
1341, 1348 (D. Idaho 1989); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3276,3280-81. 
266 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-88, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3276,3279-81; see also J. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 244, at 125. 
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detect past violations, an analysis of aerial photographs, and chem-
ical sampling of soil and ground water.267 If a purchaser does not 
exercise due diligence in purchasing property, a court probably 
would find that the purchaser does not qualify for the third-party 
defense. 268 
VI. WETLANDS PURCHASER LIABILITY: ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, 
CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE, AND DUE DILIGENCE 
A. The Statutory and Case Law Argument for Purchaser 
Liability 
Purchaser liability for the restoration of illegally filled wetlands 
will fulfill the congressional objective of maintaining and restoring 
the nation's waters, including wetlands. 269 Holding purchasers liable 
will protect wetlands in several ways: it will deter the illegal filling 
of wetlands, provide for increased restoration of illegally filled wet-
lands, and dampen the incentive to purchase illegally filled wetlands. 
Perhaps most important, purchaser liability will increase public 
awareness about the importance of wetlands. 
Purchaser liability also will allow courts to remedy the continuing 
harm of filled wetlands.270 Compared to liquid water pollution, which 
dissipates when discharged into wetlands, fill material remains in 
wetlands, destroying their value and function. 271 For example, filled 
wetlands do not filter pollutants, provide wildlife habitat, or store 
flood waters. 272 
Courts may hold purchasers liable for the restoration of illegally 
filled wetlands for several reasons. Courts have held that illegally 
filled wetlands are a continuing CWA violation. Courts have inter-
preted the CW A as establishing liability for the number of days that 
267 J. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 244, at 207-19. 
268 Glass, supra note 242, at 397. 
269 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). Recently, the Corps and the EPA recognized the special 
significance of wetlands. See WETLANDS MOA, supra note 40, at 2. The Corps declared that 
it would strive to achieve a goal of no net loss of wetlands. Id. See generally Gardner, The 
Army·EPA Mitigation Agreement: No Retreat from Wetlands Protection, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,337 (1990); Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands: The Army·EPA Memo· 
randum of Agreement on Mitigation Under the Section 404 Program, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,213 (1990); Want, The Army-EPA Agreement on Wetlands Mitigation, 
20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,209 (1990). 
270 See United States v. Carter, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1810, 1812 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
271 See North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Woodbury, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941, 1943 
(E.D.N.C. 1989). 
272 J. KUSLER, supra note 20, at 7. 
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wetlands remain filled. 273 A CWA violation does not just consist of 
the days that a defendant has actually discharged fill into wetlands.274 
Courts also assess civil penalties based on the number of days that 
illegal fill remains in wetlands275 and have held defendants liable for 
restoration years after a defendant has actually filled wetlands. 276 
Because filled wetlands are a continuing CW A violation, purchasers 
of illegally filled wetlands may be held liable for their restoration. 
Restoration case law supports the proposition that non-performing 
parties,277 such as purchasers, may be held liable for the restoration 
of illegally filled wetlands. Because courts have held a landowner 
who inherited illegally filled wetlands278 and a purchaser with actual 
and constructive knowledge of illegally filled wetlands279 liable for 
restoration, a party need not actually fill wetlands to be liable for a 
CWA violation. 
A court's power to hold non-performing parties liable also may be 
inferred from the broad and inclusive language of the CWA's en-
forcement sections. Section 309(b) authorizes the EPA to commence 
a civil action "for appropriate relief. "280 Section 309(a) authorizes the 
EPA to issue a compliance order against "any -person" in violation 
of the CWA.281 "Appropriate relief" and "any person" are broad 
enough to include purchasers and other non-performing parties. 
Given this broad language, courts should not limit the relief autho-
rized by the CWA by refusing to hold purchasers liable. 
Purchasers might object to purchaser liability because the CWA 
makes illegal "any discharge by any person. "282 Thus, an argument 
could be made that only people who actually discharge fill into wet-
lands may be held liable. Purchasers would argue that, because there 
is no express statutory language authorizing purchaser liability, 
273 See supra text accompanying notes 100-13. 
274 See, e.g., Woodbury, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1943; United States v. Cumberland 
Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1183 (D. Mass. 1986), afl'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 626 (E.D. Va. 1983), 
aff'd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
275 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text. 
276 See, e.g., Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1183. A purchaser may argue that the 
cases that treat filled wetlands as a continuing CWA violation do not establish that illegally 
filled wetlands are a continuing violation that purchasers must remedy. A purchaser may 
argue that these cases only establish that a person who discharges fill must remove the fill 
remaining in wetlands. 
277 Non-performing parties are parties who have not actually filled wetlands ,illegally. 
278 United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204, 1205, 1215 (W.D. Tenn. 1987). 
279 United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1983). 
280 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988). 
281 Id. § 1319(a). 
282 Id. § 1311(a). 
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courts should refuse to hold purchasers liable. If congress had in-
tended to hold purchasers liable, they should have included specific 
language authorizing purchaser liability.283 A purchaser would see 
the imposition of purchaser liability under section 404 of the CWA 
as unwarranted judicial activism. 284 
B. Equitable Balancing and Purchaser Liability 
If courts respect the congressional objective of restoring wetlands 
and if they accord sufficient weight to environmental harm, they 
should favor restoration and not hesitate to hold purchasers liable 
when they balance the equities in deciding whether to order resto-
ration. Although the Supreme Court stated in Romero-Barcelo that 
a court does not have to issue an injunction automatically when faced 
with a statutory violation, courts may not ignore statutory viola-
tions.285 Courts must exercise their equitable discretion to achieve 
prompt compliance with the CWA and to achieve the objectives of 
the Act.286 Therefore, in wetlands cases, courts may balance the 
equities, but they must be certain to achieve prompt compliance 
with the CWA. 
The district court's decision in Cumberland Farms is an example 
of the presumption in favor of wetlands restoration that courts 
should adopt when exercising their equitable discretion.287 Ruling 
upon a wetlands restoration plan, the district court stated that courts 
should order restoration unless the detriments of a restoration plan 
significantly outweigh the benefits.288 The court found that the con-
trolHng law and the CWA's legislative intent favored restoration. 289 
283 A purchaser also may argue that CERCLA liability for hazardous waste shows that 
Congress knows how to hold purchasers liable. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Nevertheless, 
the CWA grants courts broad power to issue injunctions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988). 
These broad powers indicate that Congress trusted the courts to determine appropriate 
remedies for CWA violations. If courts prove reluctant to hold purchasers liable for illegally 
filled wetlands, a CWA amendment creating purchaser liability may be necessary to protect 
wetlands. Any amendments to the CWA may create too strict a standard ofliability, however, 
and may be unfair to purchasers. Scholars have criticized CERCLA, which creates purchaser 
liability for hazardous waste, as being too strict. J. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 244, at 7-8. The 
SARA amendments to CERCLA tried to soften purchaser liability by creating an innocent-
landowner defense. Glass, supra note 242, at 396. Commentators, however, have attacked 
this defense as not giving purchasers any real relief from liability. Id. Accordingly, leaving 
purchaser liability to the flexibility of equitable discretion may be the wisest course. 
284 For a response to this criticism, see supra text accompanying notes 269-81. 
285 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 321 (1982). 
286 Id. 
287 United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1182 (D. Mass. 1986), a/I'd, 
826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
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The Weisman tests, which courts use to determine whether to 
order restoration,290 allow a court broad flexibility to consider non-
environmental factors. Many of these, such as the cost to the defen-
dant,291 weigh against restoration. 292 Courts should consider non-
environmental factors but should not over-emphasize them. The 
Weisman tests should be used with an awareness of the environ-
mental harm caused by filled wetlands and with a special awareness 
for environmental harm that is not immediately apparent.293 Courts 
should follow the Cumberland Farms decision and exercise the Weis-
man tests realizing that the controlling law, the legislative intent, 
and the harm to the environment all favor restoration. 294 
Courts, however, should neither issue an injunction automatically 
nor create an irrebuttable presumption in favor of restoration. Ju-
dicial consideration of non-environmental factors, including the harm 
to a defendant, is necessary to prevent purchaser liability from 
becoming unfair. Equitable discretion gives courts flexibility to tailor 
the remedy to the violation. For example, courts should refuse to 
impose liability for restoration on a purchaser of residential property 
who purchases property without knowledge that the property con-
tains illegally filled wetlands if restoration would require removal of 
the purchaser's home. 295 Courts should be more willing to hold com-
mercial purchasers of property that is obviously wetlands liable for 
restoration.296 Thus, courts should exercise their equitable discretion 
with a presumption in favor of restoring wetlands but with an aware-
ness that purchasers should not be held liable unjustly. 
C. The Nature of Purchaser Liability for the Restoration of 
Illegally Filled Wetlands 
Given that the CWA and restoration case law authorizes courts to 
hold purchasers liable, purchasers should be held liable if they have 
290 United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1342-43 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
291 United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 
(1985). 
292 See supra notes 155-88 and accompanying text. 
293 See Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1346. 
294 See United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1182 (D. Mass. 1986), afi'd, 
826 F.2d 1151 (lst Cir 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988). 
295 See United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 698 (D. N.J. 1987) (court denied 
restoration because it would require removal of residences of purchasers, who had no knowl-
edge of illegally filled wetlands); United States v. Board of Trustees of Fla. Keys Community 
College, 531 F. Supp. 267, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (court refused to order restoration of illegally 
filled wetlands although defendant had to create new wetlands to replace the illegally filled 
wetlands). 
296 See infra text accompanying notes 305-09. 
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actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of illegally filled 
wetlands or if they fail to be duly diligent in their purchase. A 
purchaser who had actual and constructive knowledge of the pres-
ence of illegally filled wetlands was held liable for restoration in 
United States v. Robinson.297 Although Robinson involved a pur-
chaser who was engaged in a fraudulent scheme to evade Corps 
jurisdiction,298 the Robinson decision illustrates that courts will con-
sider holding purchasers liable if they have actual or constructive 
knowledge of illegally filled wetlands. 299 
Courts should adopt the Robinson precedent and hold purchasers 
liable if they have actual or constructive knowledge. Actual knowl-
edge would consist of knowledge of the existence of illegally filled 
wetlands, of a federal enforcement action, or of a lawsuit alleging a 
CWA violation. Constructive knowledge would exist when the Corps 
or the EPA provides notification of a lawsuit against a defendant by 
filing a lis pendens against the property involved in the lawsuit. 300 
In addition to liability premised on actual or constructive knowl-
edge, purchasers should be held liable for a failure to be duly diligent 
when they purchase property containing illegally filled wetlands. 
CERCLA holds purchasers liable for the cleanup of hazardous waste 
if purchasers fail to exercise due diligence when they buy property 
containing hazardous waste. 301 The concept of a duly diligent inves-
tigation may be applied to the purchase of illegally filled wetlands. 
To satisfy a wetlands due diligence requirement, purchasers could 
investigate a site to see if it contained any wetlands. For many types 
of wetlands, a purchaser easily could see whether a piece of property 
contains wetlands. If property contained wetlands, a purchaser 
would be on notice that the property could contain illegally filled 
wetlands, and would know to investigate further. Purchasers could 
research whether a piece of property contains filled wetlands by 
examining aerial photographs and soil samples. 302 At the very least, 
297 570 F. Supp. ll57, ll64 (M.D. Fla. 1983). 
298 [d. at ll62. 
299 See id. at ll64. 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 216-24. Constructive knowledge also could exist 
because of the condition of property. For example, a purchaser would have constructive 
knowledge if property was obviously wetlands and if there were signs of recent filling. For a 
discussion of this type of constructive knowledge, see infra text accompanying notes 301-02. 
301 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). 
302 In United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76 (W.D. Ky. 1987), afl'd, 852 F.2d 189 (6th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. ll31 (1989), the court based its finding that the defendant 
illegally filled wetlands on an analysis of aerial photographs and of the soil beneath the filled 
wetlands. [d. at 81. Experts can detect when and if wetlands have been filled by comparing 
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purchasers could ask the seller for a written guarantee that, as far 
as the seller knew, there were no filled wetlands on the property. 303 
If filling had occurred, the purchasers could obtain a copy of the 
Corps permit authorizing the filling or determine whether the filling 
was exempt from the permitting requirement of section 404 of the 
CWA. 
Wetlands due diligence would be narrow in scope. Purchasers 
would only have to be concerned about areas that possibly contain 
wetlands. Due diligence would not apply to areas that obviously are 
not wetlands or wetlands that were filled before Corps jurisdiction 
applied to those wetlands. 304 
Because purchaser liability would be exercised in the context of a 
court's equitable discretion, purchaser liability would be sufficiently 
flexible to avoid inequity. Like CERCLA liability, courts could con-
sider the type of transaction in deciding whether to order restora-
tion. 305 The legislative history of CERCLA establishes that com-
mercial transactions have the highest standard ofliability, residential 
transactions have a lower standard, and inheritances and bequests 
have the lowest standard of liability.306 Courts could use a similar 
standard in assessing wetlands liability. A corporation engaged in 
development could be held to a higher standard of liability than a 
residential landowner. A court also could consider any special knowl-
edge or skill of the defendant. 307 
Courts also could consider the type of wetlands involved. Courts 
could be more strict with purchasers of property, such as tidal 
marshes and swamps, that is obviously wetlands. Courts could be 
less strict if the wetlands was not obviously wetlands, for example, 
a wet meadow that was wet only during certain times of the year. 
Courts have additional flexibility because they do not have to force 
a purchaser to pay for the entire cost of restoration. Courts may 
aerial photographs taken before any possible filling and after the wetlands have been filled. 
These aerial photographs are available at federal and state agencies. 
808 If a seller states that no wetlands filling has occurred knowing that filling has occurred, 
a purchaser could seek rescission of the contract or an abatement of the purchase price. See 
Shore Builders, Inc. v. Dogwood, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1004, 1005-06 (D. Del. 1985) (purchasers 
sought rescission of contract to buy partnership whose sole asset was an undeveloped parcel 
of land, when the Corps claimed it had jurisdiction over the parcel). 
304 SARA requires courts to consider the obviousness of the hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(35)(b) (1988). 
805 See United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (D. Idaho 
1989). 
806 [d. 
807 SARA requires courts to consider any special knowledge of the defendant. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(35)(B) (1988). 
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require third parties who have performed the actual filling, such as 
a seller, to restore wetlands on the purchased property. Thus, a 
purchaser would be required only to allow the third party on the 
purchased property to restore the wetlands. 308 
Although wetlands due diligence is a novel idea, hazardous waste 
due diligence is accepted commercial practice. 309 Due diligence should 
be applied to wetlands because of the increasing awareness of the 
importance of wetlands, the accepted nature of due diligence for 
hazardous waste, and because courts could equitably hold purchasers 
liable for failing to be duly diligent. Due diligence for the restoration 
of illegally filled wetlands also will realize the congressional intent 
to restore and maintain wetlands. . 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Clean Water Act's objective is to restore and maintain this 
nation's waters, including wetlands. Purchaser liability for the res-
toration of illegally filled wetlands will fulfill this objective. Pur-
chaser liability will improve public awareness of the importance of 
wetlands, deter the illegal development of wetlands, and remedy the 
continuing harm of filled wetlands. 
Courts have the authority under the CWA to hold purchasers 
liable for wetlands restoration because illegally filled wetlands are a 
continuing CWA violation, because non-performing parties may be 
held liable for restoration, and because the CWA's enforcement and 
liability provisions are broad enough to include purchasers. Because 
purchaser liability will further the CWA's objectives, courts should 
abandon their reluctance to hold purchasers liable. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act requires that purchasers perform a duly diligent search 
to avoid hazardous waste liability. Given that vital wetlands are 
disappearing rapidly, purchaser liability for the restoration of ille-
308 See W. WANT, supra note 28, at 12-6. In United States v. Pozsgai, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
1230 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd mem., 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990), the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania divided the cost of restoration of illegally filled wetlands among three 
liable parties, the owner of the filled wetlands and two contractors, according to the parties' 
responsibility for the damage to the wetlands. Id. at 1231. Even if a third party pays for the 
cost of restoration, restoration of filled wetlands probably would reduce the value of purchased 
property significantly. If so, a purchaser could seek a rescission of the deed transferring the 
property or seek an abatement of the purchase price. See Shore Builders v. Dogwood, Inc., 
616 F. Supp. 1004, 1005-06 (D. Del. 1985) (purchaser sought rescission or abatement from 
seller when property could not be developed because the Corps determined that the purchased 
property contained wetlands). 
309 See J. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 244, at 206. 
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gaIly filled wetlands demands a similar response. Purchasers should 
be held liable if they have actual or constructive knowledge that 
they are purchasing illegally filled wetlands or if they fail to be duly 
diligent in their purchase. Because restoration is an equitable order, 
courts will be able to hold purchasers liable without unduly punishing 
them. Courts should employ a presumption in favor of restoration 
but be aware of the hardship of forcing purchasers to restore illegally 
filled wetlands. 
